Close reading

Close reading is useful in defining terms. But if definitions are stated too tersely, they read as though dogmatic points that are being made, rather than demonstrating how the quotations from an author fit together in the way that the writer thinks they do, as they have been read. Philology appears less dogmatic and more even-handed when it makes evident how specific end-points have been arrived at. It may be the case that a particular quote could be taken within various contexts and so it could come to mean different things. But philology is not philosophy. However, philological asides should be explained as necessary methodological steps for a later solution concerning the details of arguments.

The experience of close reading shows that meanings can go in and out of focus. If a specific text is read without the help of expert commentaries say, what occurs is that the key meanings may not appear by themselves. Through the help of expert commentaries though, it may be possible to find what other well-respected persons have said of the work and to understand the parts of it are crucial. On returning to the original work, it may then be the case that the meanings that other writers had claimed were so apparent, were only latent in the original, or not clearly appearing. It may be the case that the expert commentators were claiming that a meaning was there when it was not. The experience of close reading, when many repetitions have been made, is such that meanings can become indistinct or undecidable rather than clear. A large amount of space is required to weigh up all the possibilities and combinations that arise when considering the fine detail of a text.

Refuting an argument by finding its internal inconsistencies, “the psycho-analysis of text”

Philosophical reading occurs in instances that could be called psycho-analysis of the text, to use a Freudian metaphor. This occurs when authors contradict themselves or their meaning disappears. These are interesting points in the text for they either assume that they are communicating their position to the reader with ease, or that the reader knows more than they do about the topic at hand. These passages may show that a difficulty is being glossed over. It is possible to make a philosophical point out of such contradictions, areas of vagueness and lack of clear meaning. This is hermeneutic work in the same way that Freud listened to telling mistakes in a patient. Freudian psycho-analysis is interested when patients are in transference or resistance. The transference of a text would be when the authors assume its meanings are becoming apparent or are relevant to the reader when they are not. The resistance of a text would be those cases when a communication fails to occur for the reader, when there is no meaning or a contradiction. It is permissible to point out ambiguities in a text and to state how it may be read in different ways. Skill is required in showing how a quotation can have several meanings. It is possible to hold one quotation in contrast to the ambiguous meanings that it might have, in various contexts within the same text, or within respect to other texts, and thus show its ambiguity.

Discussions and textuality

Where there has been a long-standing area of debate, it is often because there is a worthwhile or difficult problem to discuss. It is not because the thinkers and researchers involved are incompetent. Rather, where a long debate has ensued it is because a complex problem has been identified and that schools of thought concerning different types of solution have arisen. Philosophical arguments often concern long-standing philosophical problems and areas of debate. Lacks of clarity or attention to detail, and the entailments of associated arguments within a position, are other ways of demonstrating incoherence of an argument or a lack of its justification. For instance, in ascertaining how to deal with an author's claims, one approach could be discussing the possibilities or conditions for how we could sensibly talk about the particular type of concept at hand.

Philosophy concerns itself with how concepts and arguments either work, or fail to work, adequately. If something works, it means the text or position has a convincing argument or set of parameters. The business of philosophy is to show what makes an acceptable argument in a particular area. It is also possible to create criteria for testing the failure or success of arguments by relation to some agreeable standards within a specific genre. If such a ground or mutual position encompassing two or more schools of thought cannot be established, then it will not be possible to gain any advance on the dispute at hand.

There is also another important point here. For instance, arguments concerning the necessity of basing concepts on experiential learning might devolve to those concerning the philosophy of language, because they entail reference between concept and experience as its referent. Therefore, concepts, arguments and practices derived from experiential learning need to be backed up with a precise consideration of what experiences and distinctions in experience that are capable of being made by persons generally.

Arguments may have the general form: “The concept A is dependent on other concepts and situations a1, a2, a3. But it is problematic because...” Or “concept A is currently used in justifying the practice of B. But there is a counter-argument that states that A, as it is currently accepted, cannot be the case because...” An associated aim is to show how a concept functions within its region, or with associated, concepts, or objects in the world, or within an academic discipline.

Paper, stone, scissors

Perhaps certain genres of philosophical argumentation may not be able to defeat each other conclusively. For instance, the types of post-modern and deconstructive writings favoured by some continental philosophers that show multiple and undecidable meanings, deconstruct their own and other post-modernist arguments, because they too cannot sustain or enforce meaning. It is impossible to have a position that focuses on the multiplicity and undecidability of meaning and critique it in a straight forward manner.

But the precise and rigid constructions of meaning of some English language philosophers fall prey to the deconstructive type of argumentation. The battles and struggles inherent in trying to attain specific meanings portray deconstruction in action as carried through by trying to attain precision of communication between author and reader. The immense difficulty and lack of any guarantee or ability to enforce or otherwise guarantee, fix in stone, the meanings found by a reader, is a limiting case for this precise type of argument.

The phenomenological type of argument is one that refers to experience or practice of various sorts, and is not based on linguistic philosophy. One part of its argument is appealing to direct knowledge by experience and achieving revelation and insight that way. But it then requires communication of the insights, methods and findings to others. The distinctions born of experiential learning may not be the same as intellectual learning. But identifiable processes and senses need to be communicated all the same.

Rhetoric and hermeneutics lead to action

Argumentation leads to possibilities for action - and the inhibition of other actions. Conceptual claims move towards an outcome of some sort. They may justify or inhibit some types of action, standpoint or attitude based on intellectual argument only. It may be the case that some experiences provide distinctions that cannot be transparently passed on through writing and reading.